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Abstract
We consider a large community of individuals who mix strongly and meet in pairs to bet on a coin
toss. We investigate the asset distribution of the players involved in this zero-sum repeated game. Our
main result is that the asset distribution converges to the exponential distribution, irrespective of the
size of the bet, as long as players can never go bankrupt. Analytical results suggests that the exponential
distribution is a stable fixed point for this zero-sum repreated game. This is confirmed in numerical
experiments.
1 Introduction
Communities of ranked players occur in a variety of situations. Casinos routinely accommodate live player
communities engaged in gambling activities. Casino players may be ranked by the total value of their
casino tokens. Traditional board (e.g., chess, backgammon, go, etc.) and card (e.g., bridge) games also
bring together gaming communities centered around gaming federations. In this case, players are ranked
by strength of play; e.g., the Elo system. With the advent of the Internet, society experienced, like never
before, an increase in the number of gaming communities. First, the Internet has strengthen existent gaming
communities. Second, Massive Multiplayer On-line Games (MMOG) of various type (e.g., role-playing, real-
time or turn-based strategy, simulations of sports or racing events, etc.) were made available to host gaming
communities in cyberspace. Popular MMOGs have been: Ultima Online, EverQuest and World of Warcraft,
to name a few. Nearly all MMOGs use virtual currency that players earn and spend during the game. Hence,
players are easily ranked by the amount of virtual currency.
Generally, the gaming experience of one player is divided into a large numbers of matches, which are single
player, multiplayer or, possibly, team encounters, where the number of players involved is much smaller than
the community size. As a result of playing, individuals acquire gaming experience and their ranks change
actively. This setup, known as an iterated or repeated game [1], has been extensively applied to the prisoner’s
dilemma [2, 3], as well as other dilemmas [4]. The focus of previous work has been primarily finding game
strategies which have good return [2, 4–8] and differentiating traits of these strategies [5, 7, 8]. Repeated
zero-sum games have received substantially less atention [9–14].
In this paper, we develop a model for a community of players who mix strongly and meet in random
pairs to play one-on-one matches. We assume that, as a result, their ranks change according to the rule
of a zero-sum game. Hence, game rank does not stand for strength of play and may be more approriately
regarded as a game asset. This setup is equivalent to that of a community of players who play their assets
according to a zero-sum game. The zero-sum postulate guarantees that the assets (or ranks) of all players
combined are conserved, and provide the possibility for a stationary distribution of assets to exist. Assuming
that players play such that they avoid bankruptcy, we study the dynamics of asset distribution, using both
analytical and computational tools.
2 Modeling framework
We cosider N individuals and denote their assets by ai, i = 1, ..., N . We assume that individuals pair up
randomly, irrespective of game rank, to play matches of a zero-sum game. Say, player i meeets player j,
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where i, j = 1, ..., N . We assume that player i wins the match against player j with probability pi(ai, aj)
and is rewarded ∆j(aj) by player j. Thus, with probability pi(ai, aj), the assets are updated as follows
ai → ai + ∆j(aj), aj → aj −∆j(aj). (1)
In turn, player j wins the match with probability pj(ai, aj) = 1− pi(ai, aj) and then is rewarded ∆i(ai) by
player i. Hence, with probability pj(ai, aj), the assets are updated as follows
ai → ai −∆i(ai), aj → aj + ∆i(ai). (2)
We require ∆i(·) : R+ → R+ be continuous functions, such that players never go bankrupt; i.e., players
never reach zero assets paying for a match. Examples of ∆i(·) will be given subsequently.
We formally consider a time axis to order the gambling events consistently, at a rate of one event per unit
time. Hence, time is a counter for the total number of matches. The symbol ft(·) stands for the normalized
distribution of the asset a over the entire community, at time t. We write the backward Kolmogorov equation
for the game, where ft(ai)ft(aj) is the probability density that a player with asset ai meets a player with
asset aj for a match at time t
∂
∂t
[ft(ai)ft(aj)] = −ft(ai)ft(aj) + pi(a′i, a′j)ft(a′i)ft(a′j) + pj(a′′i , a′′j )ft(a′′i )ft(a′′j ), (3)
where
a′i −∆i(a′i) = ai, a′j + ∆i(a′i) = aj , a′′i + ∆j(a′′j ) = ai, a′′j −∆j(a′′j ) = aj , (4)
such that (a′i, a
′
j) are (a
′′
i , a
′′
j ) are the assets possible for the players i and j at previous time. We are interested
in equilibrium distributions of a, satisfying Eq. (3). Particularly, we look for fixed-point solutions that are
differentiable with respect to ai. The fixed-point equation resulting from Eq. (3) is
f(ai)f(aj) = pi(ai + ∆
′
i, aj −∆′i)f(ai + ∆′i)f(aj −∆′i) + pj(ai −∆′′j , aj + ∆′′j )f(ai −∆′′j )f(aj + ∆′′j ), (5)
where ∆′j ≡ ∆j(a′j) and ∆′′i ≡ ∆i(a′′i ).
3 Fixed-point analysis of an iterated zero-sum game
We discuss a community consisting on N gamblers that meet in random pairs to bet their assets on a coin
toss. Hence, pi,j(ai, aj) are constant functions, independent of ai,j , and pi + pj = 1. We assume that, to
avoid bankruptcy, each gambler bets half of his assets; i.e., ∆i(ai) = ai/2. We are interested in the long-term
distribution of assets in large communities where N →∞.
To solve Eq. (5), we consider ai,j , ∆
′
i and ∆
′′
j in the vicinity of zero. We expand f(·) in series around
(ai, aj), and then formally set ai = aj = a. The zeroth and first order expanssion yield identies. The second
order expanssion yields
f(a)
∂2f
∂a2
−
(
∂f
∂a
)2
= 0. (6)
The only normalizable solution of the above equation is f(a) = A−1e−a/A, with A > 0. Note that A = 〈a〉
is time-independent since assets change through a zero-sum game. This exponential solution is independent
on the initial asset configuration, representing a fixed point of the asset distribution. It is straightforward
to check that the negative exponential is a solution of Eq. (5), provided that pi,j are constant functions.
Remarkably, the fixed-point asset distribution is independent of the payment functions ∆i,j(·).
To investigate the stability of the fixed point solution, we perturb the solution of Eq. (3) as follows
ft(a) = 〈a〉−1e−a/〈a〉 + δf(a, t), (7)
2
where δf(a, t) f(a),∀a, at any moment of time t that we consider. We obtain a differential equation which
is first order in δf(·) and zeroth order in ∆′(·, ·)δf(·) and ∆′′(·, ·)δf(·). We set a1 = a2 = a and obtain
∂
∂t
δf(a, t) = −δf(a, t). (8)
Hence, near the fixed point, the solution of the Eq. (3) has the form
ft(a) = 〈a〉−1e−a/〈a〉 + δf(a, 0)e−t, (9)
indicating that f(·) is a stable fixed-point solution. We recall that time was introduced formally, by the
assumption that all players gamble at the same constant rate.
4 Numerical results
The numerical algorithm is brute force integration of the zero-sum iterated game. We considered a vector of
assets with N = 105 entries. We randomly chose pairs of players, carried out a match for each pair, recorded
the changes in the assets and repeated the process O(N2) times. This ensured enough matches and good
mixing between the players.
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Figure 1: Simulations of f(a) versus a. The baseline game starts with 1/N assets for each player and uses
∆
(1)
i (ai) = ai/2. We show results from variations of this game, to demonstrate properties of the fixed point
solution f(a) = 〈a〉−1e−a/〈a〉. Panel A shows results emerging from different initial distributions f0(a),
subsequently renormalized such that 〈a〉 = 1/N : all assets equal 1/N (black ), assets uniformly distributed
in [0, 1] (blue ×) and assets normally distributed according to N (1/N, 1/(5N)) (red ). Panel B shows
results emerging from three different payment functions: ∆
(1)
i = ai/2 (black ), ∆(2)i = (0.25 + η)ai, where
η is uniformly randomly distributed in [0, 1] (blue ×) and ∆(3)i = ai〈a〉/(ai + 〈a〉) (red ).
To check numerically that the asset distribution converges to a fixed point, we ran our game model
for tree distinct initial condition distributions having the average 1/N . First, the initial distributions of
assets was constant; i.e., assets were equal to 1/N , for all players. Second, we chose the assets according
to the uniform initial distribution U(0, 1). Then, we renormalized the asset values such that the average
of the initial condition distribution was 1/N . Third, we chose the assets normally distributed according to
N (1/N, 1/(5N)). The simulation results are displayed in Fig. 1A. In particular, we note good collapse of the
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three curves originating from three different initial conditions, following the expected fixed-point exponential
distribution.
Next, we tested the dependence of the fixed point solution on the choice of ∆i. We started with all
players having ai = 1/N and consider three cases. First, we assumed that the loser pays half of his assets
to the winner; i.e., ∆
(1)
i = ai/2. Second, we assumed that the loser pays a random fraction of his assets to
the winner: ∆
(2)
i = (0.25 + η)ai, where η is chosen from U(0, 1). Third, we assumed that the loser pays a
fraction 〈a〉/(ai + 〈a〉) of his assets to the winner; i.e., ∆(3)i = ai〈a〉/(ai + 〈a〉). Note that, in each of these
three cases, the player paying ∆i does not run out of assets because of payment. Numerical results show
good collapse of the three simulations, all apparently converging to the fixed-point exponential distribution.
In conclusion, we investigated the dynamics of asset distribution in a large community where players meet
one-on-one to play a zero-sum game. We referred to this zero sum game as a coin tossing game to stress
out our assumption that the chance of winning does not depend on player’s assets. We found that, in the
case where players can never go bankrupt, the asset distribution converges to the exponential distribution,
irrespective of the betting procedure. This result was suggested by both analytical and numerical approaches.
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